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SANFORD D. CLARK*

Tensions Between Water
Legislation and Customary

Rights* *
ABSTRACT
To regard customary law as an impediment to modern, rational water
management suggests a distinction between less-developed and moredeveloped systems of law. However customary law often has rich historical, cultural, religious, and social roots. Further,the annoying, inconvenient features of customary law-its dynamism; its symbiotic relationship
with the possibilityof compensation; its tendency to equate dominion over
land with dominion over water-are often present in more developed
systems of law.
The tension between customary and modern systems arisesfrom their
different notions of the private and public domains; their different ideas
of ownership and its attributes.
The insights of the Bruntland Commission (sustainable development,
inter-generationalequity etc.) require more developed legal systems urgently to limit and re-define the attributes of property. Notions of communal title, inalienability,trusteeship, the unity of human kind and nature,
of communal not individualauthority,and of a balancebetween personal
desires and community obligations, underlie many customary systems.
More developed legal systems and economic theorists are often uncomfortable with such notions. With an eye on the future, however, maybe
our question should not be how to make customary law conform to modern
notions, but vice-versa.
WATER LEGISLATION AND CUSTOMARY RIGHTS; BECOMING
CUSTOMS OR PLAIN NUISANCES?
Some years ago, in the student turmoil of the sixties, I remember a
colleague at the Melbourne Law School being taunted by the fact that all
we did was to fashion small cogs for the capitalist machine. "Small
cogs?" he shot back. "I thought we turned out the Big Wheels!" His
mechanical metaphor and perhaps even his perception of the lawyer's
*Harrison Moore, Professor of Law, Director, Centre for Natural Resources Law. University of
Melbourne.
•*T'his paper was presented at the International Association for Water Law AIDA IlI
Conference
in Alicante, Spain in December 1989.
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role in society, have been overtaken by the computer age with its own
metaphors. But I think it is still true to say that lawyers generally take
the view that our systems, our models, firmly influence the shape and
organization of society. We may give lip-service to Holmes's aphorism
that the life of the law is not logic but experience, but in developing our
legislative models we often strive for relentless logic and are frankly
intolerant of inconvenient obstacles in our path.
So it is with those of us who try to assist countries in revising their
legislative and institutional arrangements to accord with modem hydrological knowledge and principles of resource management. All too often,
inconvenient principles of customary law prove to be the spanner in the
works or the virus in the system-depending on whether you are more
comfortable with mechanical or silicone-chip imagery. My task is to look
at some of the problems which customary law creates for the legislator.
But I aspire to do more. I want to warn against the dangers of a brand
of intellectual imperialism which seeks to overrun or belittle customary
law, by demonstrating that modem systems are just as driven by ideological assumptions or belief systems as customary law. Indeed, I shall
even suggest that it is modem ideologies about fundamental rights to
property and compensation which cause most of the practical problems,
rather than customary rights.
Finally-in a death-defying leap, for one night only, and' at great
expense to the management-I shall even suggest that the time has come
for a fundamental re-evaluation of the modem attributes of property in
land and water and that values underlying some customary tenures may
well prove more significant than modern attributes of property in the longrun.
Typical Problems
Customary rights can cause problems in most areas of water management. There are problems of access, water use, land use, catchment
protection, flood-plain management, and pollution. A representative, though
by no means exhaustive, list includes the following:
* Obtaining access over adjacent lands.Difficulties can occur in
establishing and monitoring hydrological measuring stations or
in carrying pipes or drains over riparian or more remote lands.
Reticulated village water supplies can be thwarted or even destroyed through traditional or present rivalries.
* Traditional rights to traverse banks, navigate particular reaches,
or fish particular portions of a river' can conflict with bridge
I. Such difficulties are not confined to less-developed societies. Customary native fishing rights
have recently been recognized for the first time in New Zealand. See Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries
Officer. 6 N.Z.L.R. 114 (1986).
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abutments, proposals for river improvement works, weirs, or
storages.
Traditional rights to land underlying river beds, such as fights
to take stones for clay ovens, can be asserted to impose highcost premiums on taking river gravel for public construction
purposes.
Traditional rights to cultivate river beds in periods of low flowsuch as occurs in Taiwan or in the Ganges Delta--can thwart
plans for river regulation, desilting, or upper level transfers or
diversions. They can also pose immense potential for loss of
life through sudden flooding.
Traditional settlements in flood prone areas may reduce problems of carting water but have similar potential for human
disaster.
Customary agricultural practices often cause grave problems of
soil erosion, pesticide runoff, and bank degradation. In certain
instances, pastoral practices can have similar consequences.
Sometimes major dams or canals can bisect traditional grazing
routes or game migration patterns. If adequate crossings do not
exist, ecological balances in marginal areas can be destroyed
and desertification hastened.
Customary rights can be asserted in ways which prevent structures being built or water being diverted. Active or passive
resistance can occur for reasons unrelated to the actual occupation of land or use of water. Particular natural features may
have spiritual, religious, or mythic significance which is too
profound to allow development of an area. Unsurprisingly, in
ard areas such natural features are often associated with water
sources.

Characteristics of Customary Legal Systems
There are several important characteristics of many customary systems
which contribute to the sort of problem identified above:
* Customary rights often transcend mere rules of convenience or
practice. Sometimes they are firmly based in formal religion
and are matters of holy writ and exegesis, In other cases, although not evidenced by written record or formal religion, they
stem from profoundly spiritual values. The Australian Aborigine, in whose country I live, has a deep, mystical, spiritual link
with traditional lands which can only be inadequately portrayed
by the concepts in my philosophical and religious vocabulary.
I gather that similar spiritual links are felt by the Inuit and other
North American indigens.
* Customary fights also sometimes grow from historic rivalries
and jealousies. Mere law is often powerless to override either
historic bonds or enmities and an administrative system which
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fails to assume their continuation does so at its peril. P.V.C.
piping responds nicely to a bush-knife- and tank spigots are
excellent sinkers for fishing lines!
" Customary law is dynamic. This is often the most disconcerting
aspect for a lawyer. If, for example, a river system has never
carried fish in the past, that would not prevent adjacent people
asserting a prior customary right to take all the fish, if a lakeseeding program were successful. Or in an island which has not
previously developed the technology for irrigated agriculture,
there is no reason why a customary fight to divert water for
irrigation should not be asserted, once the technology is introduced.
* An allied notion is that the limits of customary fights are often
imprecise in spatial or quantitative terms. The right may be far
larger than the capacity to exercise it (for example, a right to
all the water in a river) simply because no prior competition
has put it to the test.
• Because of the dynamic character and uncertain scope of many
customary rights, recognition of their existence must necessarily
depend on assertion rather than proof. For a lawyer used to
objective standards of proof, the lack of externally verifiable or
corroborative indicia of an asserted right is profoundly unsettling. How do I know that this is really a sacred site, and that
someone isn't just making it up?
* Under many customary systems, even where the notion of trade
or barter between clans exists, there is no notion of transmissible
or alienable title to land and its natural attributes, like water.
Thus, intrepid European explorers may have thought that their
blandishments of blankets and beads procured them rights to
occupy land. Subsequent resentment at their settlement was
perhaps due more to the absence of a concept of alienability
than to fickleness on the part of a native population.
* Most customary systems recognize communal, rather than individual rights over land. Insofar as it is proper to speak of
people owning land (for some Australian clans, it might equally
be argued that the land owns the people) it is the clan which
holds the key to the land's destiny. Even where the clan speaks
through a chief-as with the Fijian maaqali--or through an
elected spokesman-as with the pulenu'u in Western Samoait is the clan, not individuals, who hold title.
" Gaining voluntary agreement of a clan to a particular development proposal is invariably a lengthy and precarious process,
especially if alienation of land is required and there is no underlying concept to support it. Talking a proposal through to
final consensus by all ranking members of a clan will often be
required. This stands in stark contrast to the needs of, say, a
vast mining consortium contemplating a development proposal
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in a market of fluctuating commodity prices and interest rates.
Their call for "fast-track," "one-stop" licensing procedures and
for certainty of obligations over the life of a project is incompatible with traditional modes of decisionmaking.
In terms of modern principles of water management, the basic objection
to customary rights and the values which underlie them is that they seem
to acknowledge no community obligations superior to the internal obligations between clan members. It becomes possible for one clan to dominate the various productive uses of a water source and either to exclude
others, or only to admit others at a price. These deficiencies we see as
being linked to the fact that they arise from custom, rather than agreement
or legislation, which we think are more typical of modern legal systems.
Characteristics of Modern Legal Systems
If we compare modem systems of law-and I speak simply of the
common law with which I am most familiar-we discover not only that
custom is a powerful source of law, but that, were it not for legislative
intervention, principles developed by the courts would create precisely
the same difficulties.
According to English legal theory, custom ceased to be a formal source
of law in 1189.2 This arbitrary date bespoke the lawyer's need for certainty
of proof of an alleged custom and was formally fixed as time immemorial,
or the date prior to which "the mind of man runneth not to the contrary."
Since that time, the theory says, sources of the common law are either
the principles declared by the courts or legislation made by Parliament
or its delegates-but certainly not custom.
But we know lawyer's games better than that! The principles of the
common law riparian doctrine and the rights of an overlying owner to
abstract groundwater were not, in fact, settled by the Courts until the
nineteenth century3-although, as work by Professor Tony Scott now
indicates, there was an important traffic in entitlements to water between
rival mill owners on the same stream throughout the eighteenth century.
Those principles manifestly had their origins in custom, bolstered by the
much earlier rules of trespass, which effectively prevented non-riparians
from gaining access to the stream. But the rules for sharing among the
class of riparians were based on custom; albeit customs which were
rational in their fertile climate or origin and involved fairly sophisticated
notions of correlative rights.
Custom was, of course, a much more obvious and immediate source
2. This was the year in which the reign of Henry 1i. who was instrumental in establishing a
national system of judicial administration through the King's Courts. came to an end.
3. Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & Ad. 1. 110 Eng.Rep. 692 (1833); Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353. 155
Eng.Rep. 579 (1851).
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of law in California in the 1840s. Although Congress did not move to
pass legislation to govern land occupation for some 18 years after the
purchase of California from Mexico in 1848, the miners rapidly filled
the void with their own customs which had the force of law between
them and were soon recognized by both the first Californian legislature
and the Courts.' This became the prior appropriation doctrine. It is also
interesting that, shortly thereafter, the city of Los Angeles successfully
asserted rights under pre-existing Mexican law-the so called pueblo
rights to water-in order to make out a superior claim to water in the

Los Angeles River."
If we look at the developed common law riparian doctrine, we find
that it:

" limits the use of water to land in contact with the stream;
" allows unlimited use only for domestic and stock purposes;
" allows use for extraordinary purposes (for example, irrigation
and industry) only if the water is returned to the stream substantially undiminished in quantity or quality;
* allows an upstream owner to acquire rights to use for extraordinary purposes or to pollute a stream by 20 years of continuous
enjoyment; and
* allows a downstream owner to sue to prevent any upstream use
for extraordinary purposes, even if the downstream owner suffers no injury, simply because the diversion might otherwise
become a prescriptive right.
In other words, these rules limited the enjoyment of water to a narrow
clan (that is, those owning water in contact with the stream); only acknowledged correlative rights and duties between members of the clan;
acknowledged no supervening interests in the wider community; and
potentially prevented the use of water for productive purposes (other than
domestic and stock supply) by members of the clan and others. It thus
became possible for one clan to dominate the various productive uses of
a water source and either to exclude others or only to admit others at a
price.The evils were precisely the same as those we now object to in
many customary law systems-save only for the fact that individuals
4. See generally. S. Weil. Water Rights in the Western States. ch.5 (3d ed. 191 I).
5. Although aCalifornian Statute of April 13. 1850 sought to adopt the common law of England
as the rule of decision in State Courts, the Civil Practice Act of 1851. §621 declared that. in actions
respecting mining claims, local customs would rule "when not in conflict with the ... laws of this
State." The resulting tussle between the common law riparian doctrine and the customary rule of
prior appropriation was not finally resolved until Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
6. Notwithstanding the statutory adoption of the common law as the rule of decision, the same
1850 Act provided that the city succeeded "to all the rights, claims and powers of the Pueblo de
Los Angeles in regard to property." After much litigation, that conflict was ultimately resolved by
giving the city rights to the entire flow of the river. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255. 10 Pac. 674 (1886);
Vernon Irrigation Co. v. Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237; 39 Pac. 762 (1895).
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could exercise their rights to exclude without reference to other members
of the clan!
Masters of the Universe: Tools for Conquest and Conversion
When these rules were transported to colonial environments, their inappropriateness was rapidly recognized in communities wanting to abstract water for extensive irrigation, remote mining, and consumptive
industrial uses. Lawyers confronted precisely the same problems as water
managers now confront with many customary systems. In the United
States, judicial and legislative action qualified the doctrine in the East
(the "reasonable use" doctrine) or supplanted it in the West (the "prior
appropriation doctrine").
In other colonies, the effect of the riparian doctrine was neutralized by
a public lands policy which prevented land being privately held to the
edge of a watercourse. This meant that the State was the sole riparian
proprietor. Further, it could and did legislate in ways which gave the
State supervening rights to the use, flow, and control of waters. But this
was generally done in ways which guaranteed to landowners the same
unfettered abstractive rights which they might have had under the common
law.
Thus landowners adjacent to a stream were given rights to take water,
without charge or any permit, to use water for domestic purposes, to
water stock on the land, and to irrigate a household garden of limited
extent, the produce of which was not commercially sold or bartered.
Beyond this, such landowners had no superior rights. Together with other
citizens they could apply for permits to abstract and use water for other
productive purposes.
In most cases, the implantation of the riparian doctrine and its subsequent statutory qualifications overrode preexisting customary law where
it existed. The precise relationship between local customary law and the
imported law of a colonial power has been, and still is, a matter for
considerable judicial controversy. In the rare instance where there was
no indigenous population at the time of colonial settlement, no problem
arose. Where a colony was attached by conquest, international law required recognition of prevailing local law. More often, however, colonial
settlers established themselves among existing inhabitants. Sometimes,
as in Fiji, territory was voluntarily ceded to a colonial power. In such
cases the status of indigenous law still causes problems.
Perhaps the most sensible solution was suggested by Chief Justice
Marshall in the United States Supreme Court.' In his view, "discovery"
by a colonial power gave that power sovereignty as against other potential
colonial powers. While the colonial power obtained ultimate dominion,
7. Johnson v. M'Intosh. 21 U.S. 543. 591-92 (1823).
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its sovereignty was subject to indigenous rights of occupancy. whether
or not those traditional rights conformed to the colonist's notions of
occupation or ownership. The traditional rights of occupation were legal
rights but could not be transferred by indigenous people except to the
colonial power which alone had power to extinguish native title. This
doctrine has not only been the basis of recognition of traditional rights
in the United States, but has been most influential in Canada and New
Zealand.'
Other jurisdictions used lawyer's games to avoid recognizing local
tenures and customs. Perhaps the most blatant and discreditable example
was in Australia. There, the orthodox view is that the Australian colonies
were terra nullius and occupied by settlement and not conquest-with
the necessary implication that there were no indigenous inhabitants, no
local titles, and no local system of law.' As recently as 1971, Mr Justice
Blackburn could not by-pass that presumption. He did concede that Aboriginal clans undoubtedly had a legal system; but the rights and duties
relating to land were not such as would amount to proprietary interests
under Australian law. This was because "property, in its many forms,
generally implies the right to use or enjoy, the right to exclude others,
and the right to alienate."'"
Mr Justice Blackburn's criteria are interesting, for they betray the
ideology which lay behind nineteenth century developments of land conveyancing and tenure. Several English public inquiries were convened to
find ways of cheaply and easily determining who owned a particular piece
of land and of equally cheaply selling or mortgaging it." In colonies.
more so than in England, land ownership was within reach of many.
rapidly became a mercantile security and commodity, and inevitably created problems of absentee landowners. Small wonder that the Torrens
system was designed and piloted in a colony.' 2 Not only was the mercantile
8. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661. 667 (1974): Calder v. AttorneyGeneral for British Columbia. 1973 S.C.R. 313 (1973): Guerin v. The Queen (1984) 2 S.C.R. 335,
377-78 (1984): R v. Symonds (19871 N.Z.PC.C. 387. 390: Re London and Whitaker Claims Act
1871 (18721 NZ.L.R. 41, 49: Nircaha Tamaki v. Baker (1902) N.Z.P.C.C. 371. 384.
9, This view relies heavily on Blackstone's dichotomy between "'settled'*and "conquered" territories. It is based on the authority of Cooper v. Stuart, 14 App.Cas. 286 (1889) and was unhesitatingly adopted in Millirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd. 17 F.L.R 141 (1971). The doctrine received
some support in the High Court in Coc v. The Commonwealth. 53 A.L.J.R. (1979) but more recently
at least one member of the High Court expressed a preference for Chief Justice Marshall's doctrine
in Johnson v. M*intosh: Gerhardy v. Brown, 59 A.L.J.R. 311. 346 (1985) (per Deane. J.). The
historical inapropriateness of the doctrine has recently been conclusively demonstated: H. Reynolds.
The Law of the Land (1987).
10. Millirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ld. 17 FL.R. 141, 272 (1971).
II. Real Property Commission 1828-1832: House of Lords Select Committee on the Burdens
affecting Real Property, 1846; Registration and Conveyancing Commission 1850: Registration of
Title Commission 1857.
12. Pike, Introduction of the Real Property Act in South Australia. I Adel.L.R. 169 (1961):
Whalan. Immediate success of registration of title to land in Australia and earlv failures in England.
2 New Zealand U.L.Rev, 416 (1967).
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environment appropriate, but also topographical surveys had to be executed before lands could be alienated from the Crown, thus providing
the raw data for accurate descriptions of titles.
Apart from countries like Fiji-which actually was ceded to the British
Crown to prevent traditional lands being alienated from traditional owners
and passing into European hands-the ideology of land as an economic
asset was engrafted on to all customary or traditional systems in colonial
countries. Land was a commodity which could be pledged as a security
or transferred to a more highly-valued use. Anything which would reduce
delay and transaction costs should be encouraged.
Land consolidation programs were often the paternalist means of forcing the same ideologies on native populations. ' True, agricultural productivity could often be enhanced by laying out lands, irrigation, transport
and other community services and placing villages in more convenient
localities. But in many instances, newly-allotted holdings were entered
in registration systems, and registration systems require identifiable owners, not amorphous clans. Further, if land was to be viewed as a capital
asset-to allow money to be raised for agricultural machinery, fertilizer,
and livestock-lenders demanded certainty of the borrower's title. The
invariable result was individualization of previous communal titles.
There were other significant elements of ideology close to the surface.
The United States Reclamation Acts, the Australian Closer Settlement
Acts and similar legislation were dictated by a "home-maintenance"
concept. The idea was to avoid the European model of a landed aristocracy
and an untenured peasantry by creating a prosperous yeomanry, all settled
on farms just right for one family to farm profitably and efficiently. Not
only did this ideology project clear views about the place of the family
in the wider community (which conflicted with many customary views
of the clan), but it also often required specific land use as a condition of
tenure. Annual commitments to "develop" the land had to be met. This
meant deforestation and clearing for pasture and fencing, the commencement of irrigation, and all the other enthusiastic pursuits of a pioneer
society.
It is only now, in retrospect, that the consequences of such ideologies
are manifest. In geophysical terms the development ethic has left a trail
of diminished rain forests, accumulating dry land salinity, soil erosion,
land degradation, and desertification. In irrigation areas, insufficient early
attention to drainage has brought rising water, tables, increased on-farm
salinity and problems of in-stream salinity, requiring more and more water
for dilution flows if downstream uses are to be maintained.
The social consequences, particularly for traditional communities, have
been no less profound. Individualization of titles certainly empowered
13. The practical, but idelogically charged. justifications for these programs are well set out in
S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration. chs. 12 & 13 (1978).
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those who had no previous ability to deal with land to pledge it. But in
many instances this has been followed by chronic indebtedness and foreclosure, with the result that land has once more inevitably moved into
the hands of a landed class and irrevocably away from traditional owners.
More subtly and profoundly, such changes in land tenure have led to
the collapse of the traditional structures of authority and community,
hastened the drift to the cities, and substituted the blight of urban poverty
for simple but balanced subsistence communities, While the physical
consequences of a modern development ethic may just be reversible in
the long-term, the social consequences are not.
My contention is thus that modem systems of resource law are no less
driven by ideology than customary systems, that they have not shown
themselves to be any more attentive to the longer-term good of society,
and that the rules they have erected have led to the gradual but certain
destruction of the resource-base, just as surely as the most flagrantly
improvident traditional agricultural practices.
The Notions of Private Property and Compensation
In January 1970, 1 recall being present at discussions in the Ministry
of Water and Power in Teheran. The familiar problem was what to do
about a village community which continued to re-locate, year after tragic
year, in a flood path with the inevitable consequence of destruction and
loss of life. A desperate solution was mooted. Level the village, but rebuild it on higher ground with its own water supply. "But you can't do
that" expostulated the Peace Corps volunteer sitting next to me. 'It's
against the Fifth Amendment!"
The subsequent fluctuations in international alignments have lent recurrent poignancy to the tale. But for pragmatists like myself, the problem
remains. The harsh fact is that the single most persistent and universal
deterrent to more effective land and water management in developing
countries is not lack of political will, lack of know-how, or even lack of
manpower-although these all have their role. The principal deterrent is
fear of the obligation to pay compensation.
Although the notions of the right to private property and the obligation
to pay compensation have now found their way into customary international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the duty to
pay compensation is comparatively new. The Founding Fathers of the
United States Constitution--good Lockeans all-forgot about it and it
was tacked on as an afterthought. It fails to figure in the written constitutions of the Australian colonies or the States which succeeded them at
federation. But most twentieth century constitutions do contain an obligation to pay just compensation-and this includes nearly all post-colonial
societies, from the smallest Caribbean or Pacific nation to India.
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But the problem is not confined to less-developed or newer nations.
Partly out of a desire to maintain consistency with the doctrines developed
to support its oil wealth, Texas courts fashioned a doctrine which makes
an overlying landowner the owner of subjacent groundwater. Subsequent
attempts to devise an administrative regime to force landowners to limit
pumping in order to maintain a sustainable yield proved impracticable,
for anything other than a voluntary regime would be interpreted as a
taking and against the Fifth Amendment.
Sometimes courts have been surprisingly inventive in overcoming the
problem. The extensive program of land reform in India was undertaken
pursuant to a series of statutes which were eventually successfully challenged as infringing constitutional guarantees of freedom of property. But
the court courageously gave a twist to the American doctrine of prospective overruling, which allowed it to validate everything already done
under the Acts, but declare any future use of them unconstitutional. 4
For many less-developed countries, the feasibility of introducing land
use controls which restrict pastoral or agricultural activities on sensitive
lands, or prevent cultivation close to river banks, for example, depends
entirely upon whether such actions will invoke an obligation to pay compensation. Most regulatory action lies ahead, so the particular conjuring
trick used by the Indian Court is not available. Further, many countries
lack a developing jurisprudence on compensation, simply because public
authorities either prefer to arrange for consensual acquisition of private
land (which often accords far more closely to customary practices) or
because they are not prepared to risk their slender budgets on costly
litigation with uncertain results.
In the absence of home-grown principles-fashioned in the light of
local development needs, prior customs, economic ci.rcumstances, and
the government's capacity to pay-advisers and judges naturally (but
perhaps too readily) turn to North American and European practices for
guidance. It takes a courageous court to chart a new. less-generous course
and its capacity to throw off foreign influence is sometimes hampered by
the possibility of external judicial review by, say, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council (where such links remain), a regional Court of
Appeal, or the practice in many smaller countries of convening an ultimate
Court of Appeal from judges trained and working in more developed legal
systems.
The problem is exacerbated by two characteriztics of customary rights-their dynamism and their uncertain extent. My previous example of the
assertion of fishing rights where there had previously been no fish, was
in fact made as a bid to obtain compensation from the commercial fishery
for which the waters had been stocked! Cynics point to an apparently
14. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 54 A.I.R. 1643 (1967).
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symbiotic relationship between the occurrence of customary rights and
the prospect of compensation. If this is a just observation, perhaps it is
simply that traditional communities have too readily absorbed the cultural
values of modem legal systems.
The question remains: Is it customary law which is the real obstacle
to better land use and water management or the self-imposed modem
shackles of notions of private property and compensation?
The fundamental challenge which modem constitutional guarantees of
private property and compensation pose for customary values is well
illustrated by Fiji. There, some 90 percent of all land continues to be
owned by Fijian mataqali or clans, but is leased and administered by a
Native Lands Trust Board which collects revenues and distributes it to
the mataqali, w At the time of the election of the Bavadra Government,
significant litigation was pending to determine whether the constitutional
guarantee of private property required the Native Lands Trust Board to
pay a proportionate share of revenues directly to each member of the
mataqali, rather than to the group. If such a challenge were successful,
it would threaten traditional notions of community and authority just as
surely as individualization of tenure would have done. Yet from the date
of cession in 1874 to the present, the primary motive had been to preserve
historic notions of community, authority, and tenure.
In modem terms, one must deplore the unconstitutionality of the subsequent succession of military coups. But at another level, one can understand the vehement attempt to preserve the customary way of life
which the initial cession of Fiji to the British Crown had intended to
secure for all time.
Co-Existing with Custom
If custom and legislation to promote optimum water management can
be made to co-exist, so much the better. Very rarely, the formal role
accorded to custom by a legal system makes this difficult. Part of the
hard bargaining which wove the 80-odd distinct island populations of
Vanuatu into a nation was an undertaking that custom would continue as
a potent source of lav. This is under-pinned, both by a constitutional
declaration" and by an unusual reversal of normal power relationships
which makes the laws of local councils, on matters of shared legislative
competence, prevail over central government legislation. Water supply
happens to be a matter of shared competence."
15. Native Lands Ordinance cap. 114; Native Land Trust Ordinance cap. 115.
16. Section 72 of the Constitution of Vanuatu provides that "the rules of custom shall form the
basis of ownership and use of land in the Republic." Section 93 provides that "customary law shall
continue to have effect as pat of the law of the Republic."
17. Decentralisation Act of 1980. §27.
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Such provisions are hard to out-flank. There is little point in proposing
model by-laws or rules for each local council to implement, as the rationale of the system is to preserve diversity, not promote uniformity.
The only possible solution lies in the fact that local councils do not have
an effective revenue base and cannot undertake water supply works,
whereas the central government not only has a taxing power but also has
access to foreign aid. He who pays the piper calls the tune!
More often, it is possible to devise solutions which accommodate the
quintessential elements of custom but isolate the peripheral difficulties of
its dynamic and uncertain nature. Sometimes this requires quite clever
manipulation of doctrine. Consistent with the economic values underlying
its land tenure system, Australian law regards any fetter on the power to
alienate land as void and against public policy. Nor can its system accommodate the idea of clan ownership. In devising a system which would
allow traditional Aboriginal owners to regain their land without creating
individual tenures, but which would ensure that land was inalienable and
could only be dealt with in ways agreed on by the clan, the Commonwealth
Act was inventive." Land is held in perpetuity by an Aboriginal Land
Trust which has no power of alienation but which can create lesser interests
(leases, easements, licenses, etc.) at the direction of an Aboriginal Land
Council. The Council is empowered to negotiate with mining companies
or others seeking access to Aboriginal land, but can only do so after
obtaining the consent of the traditional owners of the land. The main
features of inalienability and clan responsibility, which are so important
to the structure of traditional society, are maintained; but an opportunity
is provided of using the land as a revenue-producing asset, thereby empowering aboriginal clans to participate in mainstream economic activity.
In dealing with rights to water, the secret is to try to isolate and entrench
those elements of customary rights which are essential to the continued
existence of traditional lifestyles and to ensure that they remain part of
the private domain without the possibility of bureaucratic interference.
Uses beyond, or for purposes other than, those uses actually employed
by the traditional society are assigned to the public domain. This allows
the wider community to share in the benefits of use for those purposes
on precisely the same terms as the clan claiming traditional rights. This
is very similar in principle to legislation which qualified the common law
riparian right, by ensuring adjacent landowners a continued right to take
water for domestic and stock purposes and to irrigate a subsistence garden,
but making any further uses subject to an administrative permit. for which
non-riparians may also apply.
Other types of customary rights can also be dealt with in this way. If
18. Commonwealth of Australia, Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976.
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the customary right to control extractions from a river bed exists for the
purpose of building village ovens, that specific right can be guaranteed.
More extensive uses (for example, taking gravel for road making) can
be subjected to administrative sanction.
Implicitly. however, such arrangements do amount to making an inventory of prevailing customary rights and freezing them at some particular date. In so doing, the notion of custom as a dynamic source of law
is necessarily challenged, as are its uncertain limits. But it does help to
confront the otherwise intractable problem of compensation, by confining
its potential application to those elements of the customary right which
are entrenched in the private domain.
I have sometimes tried to complement such arrangements by provisions
which define an interest in land for the purpose of assessing compensation,
either for damage caused to land by a water authority, or for compulsory
acquisition. The definition takes the form of a declaration that, in calculating compensation, no amount will be payable to any owner of an
interest in land, or an occupier of any land, in respect of the taking or
use of water on, adjacent to, or beneath that land, unless the effect of
that taking or use is to deprive the owner or occupier of any right to use
water conferred or acquired under sections entrenching the limited uses
previously mentioned.
Whether such provisions will pass judicial scrutiny in the light of
constitutional requirements is an open question. There is no doubt; for
example, that where a constitution only allows compulsory acquisition

for public purposes, a statutory provision that any acquisition pursuant
to the Water Act will be deemed to be for a public purpose does not oust
the court's jurisdiction to decide the matter for itself. But the provision
I suggest does not purport to debar compensation, although it does define
previously uncertain attributes of private property.
An essential element of a successful water management strategy is
gaining the cooperation of customary communities. It is, of course, important that the line between the private and public domain be drawn in
a way which is both defensible from the point of view of custom and
marketable within the community. Where communities traditionally operate through consensus, the gradual cultivation of that consensus is
indispensable. Bureaucrats sometimes need to be reminded of the fact.
A provision which empowers a public education program to be mounted
before controls are introduced in a particular area is often a useful reminder.
Involvement of traditional community officers or sources of authority
in the administration of an area is also a valuable technique. Where

traditional officers have customary authority over aspects of water-such
as the village mirau in Afghanistan-it is obviously helpful to arrange
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administrative structures in ways which enable them to exercise their
traditional authority, even if that power is now derived from statute rather
than custom. Sometimes traditional authority-figures have already been
recognized by, and incorporated into, local government structures, such
as the pulenu'u in Western Samoa. " It is then relatively simple to confer
additional functions on them, either in building and maintaining consensus
or in exercising administrative power.
Local advisory committees can also be convened to assist in building
consensus. Sometimes existing structures established for public health
programs (for example, Women's Committees) can be an effective focus.
They can also exercise supervisory and enforcement functions.
The key principles are:
" to attempt to declare and entrench those elements of existing
custom which are actually presently exercised or capable of
being exercised;
* to limit the possibility of compensation to those cases of damage
or compulsory acquisition which interfere with those entrenched
rights;
" to ensure that administrative sanction for existing uses beyond
those entrenched rights can be obtained simply and without
cost-unless, of course, they are quite irreconcilable with proper
water management practices;
" to be as flexible as possible in constructing systems of tenure.
adminstration, and control, so that they can reflect or parallel
customary systems;
" to enlist support of local customary authorities and, wherever
possible, involve them directly in water management structures;
• to pursue assiduously all avenues of community discussion,
education and involvement.
The system I propose has one major deficiency. If customary rights to
water are confined to rights which are actually exercised or capable of
exercise, and it is only those limited rights which attract compensation,
customary owners will not be able to participate in a market for attributes
of title which are not presently exploited. If my domestic garden, through
re-zoning, suddenly is in the middle of a large commercial development,
general principles allow me to sell it at its value, not as a domestic garden,
but as a commercial site. The implicit restrictions which my suggestions
place on the extent, and hence the monetary value, of customary rights,
may offend economists' notions of equity.
I am in two minds about this result. If a society is still primarily a
simple subsistence economy, I am untroubled. In a mixed economy, the
problem is different. Very often one social goal is to allow members of
19. Pulenu'u and Sui o le Malo Act of 1978.
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the subsistence economy to participate in the market economy. Generally
this can be done only by obtaining a cash flow or capital asset. The very
land consolidation programs I have spoken of earlier are aimed at this,
as are the usual forms of agricultural cooperatives. Where participation
in the market economy is an objective, windfall profits generated by the
compulsory acquisition of Gustomary interests can also provide the means
of transition. Small wonder that there often seems to be such a direct
relationship between the assertion of customary rights and the likelihood
of compensation! On the other hand, the tax base of many less-developed
countries and the commercial sector are so small that it is not possible
to shrug off compensation simply as a convenient means of re-distributing
wealth.
I'm afraid I have no simple answer to this dilemma, except to observe
that the temptation to sell one's birthright for a mess of potage is a timehonored human response.
Re-defining Proprietary Rights
In recent years, awareness of the consequences of past development
policies--deforestation, salinity, soil erosion, land degradation-have led
some more-developed societies to re-examine the nature and incidents of
land tenure. In urban areas we have learned to tolerate substantial limitations on the rights of landowners to do as they wish in the wider interests
of present and future communities. Planning permits, building regulations. historic building preservation orders, trade waste standards, and
permits all limit the actual and potential use of land and may limit (as
well as enhance) the possibility of windfall profits on sale or compulsory
acquisition.
Most observers are sceptical about the feasibility of applying similar
regulatory planning measures to the problems of rural land and economists
insist that we should put our trust in profit-maximizing behavior of the
hypothetical reasonable farmer. Others are not so sure. Recently some
local communities in Canada and Australia, at least, have begun to rethink the notion of community in the face of growing unemployment
among people with undeniable skills. In a deliberate move away from a
cash economy, such communities have established service exchange programs which allow credits to be accumulated and drawn upon through a
central exchange. While not quite a subsistence economy, it is another
sort of cashless society which draws on much deeper notions of community than are common outside customary societies. Invariably these
communities are land-based and display quite different attitudes to that
resource than their pioneer forbears.
Spurred by dissatisfaction with the gains made by traditional soil conservation programs through subsidies and regulation, some economists
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have turned to contractual models, whereby contractual targets to reduce
soil erosion are set and monitored in return for benefits. 2 Others have
re-examined different contractual forms, for example, the impact which
the historic landlord-tenant relationships and doctrines of waste had in
containing land degradation in European communities. 2' One view is that,
at least in those countries where the State is still a substantial landowner,
it should be much stricter in policing the inevitable good husbandry
clauses in its leases and making its grants of title defeasible where bad
management occurs. (Such notions obviously compromise the economist's preference for unfettered titles and security of tenure; but I am not
at all sure that incentive would be affected quite so readily or radically
as they predict.)
In short, there is now a fairly widespread re-evaluation of the development ethic and of the land tenure systems which accommodated its
growth. This may have been spurred in part by the wide airing which
the concept of sustainable development received in the 1980 World Conservation Strategy-' and will doubtless gain further momentum from the
Bruntland Commission's Report.2
Y- Its suggestion of an international convention based on principles of sustainable development and inter-generational equity quite clearly would require a fundamental re-examination
and limitation of the prevailing incidents of proprietary rights.
If a land tenure system is to encourage restraint in resource use. in
view of possible cumulative effects on the wider and future communities,
we will have to change our modes of thought. A legal system which, for
example, made transmissibility subject to a satisfactory assessment of the
husbandry of the present owner, or which fettered the inheritance of land
with charges necessary to rehabilitate it, would doubtless unsettle economists and wreak havoc with the profit motive. But if sustainable development and intergenerational equity are to guide action, rather than
simply aspirations, legal systems will have to change.
To my mind, the key element is undoubtedly a change in our resourceuse ethic. I suspect that this entails a much broader and deeper concept
of community and the duties of members to the community. It may also
require a greater acceptance of consensus rather than individual decisions
20. Dumsday & Seitz, Improving the Economic Efficiency of Programmes Aimed at Controlling
Agricultural Sources of Non-point Pollution, in Australian Water Resources Council. Non-point
Pollution in Australia 203-220 (1983); Dumsday & Seitz, A modelfor quantifyingincentivepayments
for soil conservation in cropping regions subject to water erosion, in Soil Conservation Society of
America, Soil Erosion and Conservation, (S.A. El Swaisy, W.C. Moldenhauer & A. Lo eds. 1985).
21. J. Bradsen, Soil Conservation Legislation in Australia. National Soil Conservation Program
Report (1988).
22. International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, World Conservation
Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development (1980).
23. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
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about the exploitation of resources. Some would suggest it will also
require a notion of trusteeship to be engrafted on to all forms of tenure
and even the abolition of individual tenures. Certainly, we will have to
re-think the attributes of individual tenures and possibly the very notion
of tenure itself.
In short, I believe we may yet have much to learn from systems of
customary law.

